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AL Qaida get funding from nations who support them

So who is funding Terrorists....

Viewing cable 10ABUDHABI9,
 
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin  10ABUDHABI9 2010-01-07 13:01 2010-12-05 12:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abu Dhabi
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AID-00 CEA-01 COME-00 CTME-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 DS-00 DHSE-00 EXIM-01 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 FRB-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 ITC-01 LAB-01 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00 DCP-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 OMB-00 NIMA-00 GIWI-00 SCT-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 DPM-00 NCTC-00 ASDS-00 CBP-00 BBG-00 EPAE-00 IIP-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SRAP-00 SGC-00 GSWA-00 SEEE-00 SANA-00 /004W O 071310Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE CIA WASHINGTON DC SECSTATE WASHDC 0096 INFO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVES E C R E T ABU DHABI 000009 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07 TAGS: ECON PTER KTFN AE AF EFIN CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador, State Department, U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) (S//NF) Summary

¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY. On December 15-16, 2009, Treasury Department Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury analysts, met with senior officials from the UAE’s State Security Department (SSD) and Dubai’s General Department of State Security (GDSS) to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in the UAE. Prior to these meetings, GRPO and Treasury passed to SSD and GDSS detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mendelsohn praised the UAE for its contribution to building a stable and moderate Afghanistan. He thanked the SSD and GDSS for its commitment, per the directive of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity that can be identified in the UAE. The UAE services pledged full cooperation toward the shared goal and asked for additional detailed and actionable lead information. In particular, they asked for additional passport information, telephone numbers, full names and aliases, and travel itineraries for Taliban figures suspected of traveling to the UAE. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (S//NF) During the course of the two multi-hour intelligence exchange sessions, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously shared information suggesting that Taliban-related finance officials have visited the UAE in order to raise or move funds. The UAE security officials believe that the Taliban may draw support from the sizeable Pashtun population resident in the UAE. They asked for lead information the U.S. could gather with names of individuals or entities in the UAE that may be supporting the Taliban.

¶3. (S//NF) Officials from SSD and GDSS pledged that their respective organizations would follow up on the information provided, and work through intelligence channels to share information and results and submit additional requests for information. Taliban/Haqqani Network

¶4. (S//NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the UAE has taken to combat al-Qaida and the Taliban-to include sending troops to Afghanistan-and highlighted the importance the USG places on combating Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He further stated that the Taliban and Haqqani Network are believed to earn money from UAE-based business interests. Security officials from both SSD and GDSS agreed that the Taliban and Haqqani Network are serious threats. Officials from SSD added that Iran supports the Taliban with money and weapons, helps the Taliban smuggle drugs, and facilitates the movement of Taliban and al-Qaida members. SSD officials stated that Iran’s IRGC and navy are involved with these activities. GDSS officials noted Iran’s support to Taliban in Pakistan, adding that GDSS believes that India also has supported Pakistani Taliban and Pashtun separatists.

¶5. (S//NF) Treasury analysts provided information on XXXXXXXXXXXX two senior Taliban officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to the UAE, according to U.S. intelligence. The UAE security services were not familiar with either individual and asked for additional identifying information, including current passport information used by the individuals to enter the UAE in order to track down their movements. (NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange included telephone numbers, an e-mail address, and expired passport information for crosschecking against Emirati immigration databases on both individuals. END NOTE.) SSD confirmed it checked UAE immigration systems based on the passport information provided and found no matching records. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates known either to reside in or travel to the UAE. SSD officials stated that Taliban fundraisers may use fabricated travel documents, and that Pakistanis/Afghanis often carry multiple passports, but noted that individuals from Pakistan and Afghanistan who apply for a travel visa now require an eye scan. The officials said this system should help prevent a single individual from using different aliases or passports. The services pledged to continue their investigations and share further results.

¶6. (S//NF) GDSS officials noted its ongoing monitoring of the large Afghan and Pakistani immigrant communities in Dubai and they commented that the Taliban extorts money from UAE-based Afghan businessmen. The same officials said the Taliban is also involved in kidnapping for ransom, whereby Afghanistan and Pakistan-based family members of the UAE-based businessmen are kidnapped for Taliban profit. Some Afghan businessmen in the UAE have resorted to purchasing tickets on the day of travel to limit the chance of being kidnapped themselves upon arrival in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

¶7. (S//NF) The GDSS officials stated that hawaladars are usually unwitting when they transfer money that ends up with the Taliban. They further noted that Taliban financial supporters are likely to transfer smaller amounts across multiple hawalas to minimize suspicion.

¶8. (S//NF) SSD officials discussed the Taliban and Haqqani Network’s suspected use of front companies to raise and move money. They were familiar with Haji Khalil Zadran, a Kabul-based Haqqani Network financial facilitator who has visited the UAE, but were not able to provide any details on him.

¶9. (S//NF) GDSS officials were familiar with XXXXXXXXXXXX who reportedly provides funding to the Taliban/Haqqani Network, according to U.S. intelligence. The GDSS officials stated that they do not believe XXXXXXXXXXXX is loyal to the Taliban, and noted that he has cooperated with Pakistani authorities, as well as with Afghan President Karzai. They pointed out XXXXXXXXXXXX’s past visits from former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Zaif, but noted that such visits-which may have resulted in financial support-have ceased. GDSS continues to monitor XXXXXXXXXXXX although at present they do not believe that he is a Taliban financial manager. Mendelsohn suggested that he may be a pragmatist who maintains relationships with legitimate authorities, but the USG has current information that suggests he is still involved with the Taliban.

¶10. (S//NF) GDSS discussed at length the history of the Haqqanis. They specifically highlighted Jalaluddin Haqqani’s success in exploiting images of civilian casualties in Afghanistan for fundraising purposes. (S//NF) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna

¶11. (S//NF) Mendelsohn also raised Afghanistan and Pakistan-based extremist and terrorist groups, to include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ). UAE security services were not familiar with the names of specific UAE-based LT members shared by GRPO and Treasury, but promised to follow up on the information. Mendelsohn raised the UAE-based NGO Dar al-Birr as an organization suspected of supporting JDQ. GDSS was familiar with the organization and pledged to investigate the matter.

OLSON



Viewing cable 10RIYADH61,
 Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10RIYADH61 2010-01-11 05:05 2010-12-05 12:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Riyadh
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
 
DE RUEHRH #0061/01 0110547
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 110547Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 4820
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0312
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2285
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUMICEA/USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE S E C R E T RIYADH 000061
 
NOFORN
SIPDIS
 
TREASURY FOR U/S STUART LEVEY AND AA/S HOWARD MENDELSOHN STATE FOR S/SRAP RICHARD HOLBROOKE
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020 TAGS: ECON PREL EFIN KTFN SA
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Lisa Carle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
 
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On December 13, 2009, Treasury Department Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury analysts, met with senior Saudi Mabahith officials to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in Saudi Arabia. Prior to this meeting, Treasury and GRPO officials shared with Mabahith detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mabahith pointed to the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), Saudi Arabia’s overseas intelligence agency, as having the lead on Taliban matters for the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG). Mabahith pledged to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity in the Kingdom, including fundraising carried out by Taliban leaders participating in reconciliation efforts. Mabahith asked GRPO and Treasury to provide additional detailed and actionable information to assist in its investigations.
 
¶2. (S/NF) During the course of the multi-hour intelligence exchange session, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously shared intelligence, which suggested that Taliban-related finance officials have visited Saudi Arabia in order to raise funds. Mabahith pledged to follow up on the information provided, to work through intelligence channels to share information and results, and submit additional requests for information. END SUMMARY.
(U) Taliban/Haqqani Network
 
¶3. (S/NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the Saudi government has taken to combat al-Qaida financing, and highlighted the importance the USG places on combating Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
 
¶4. (S/NF) Mabahith agreed that the Taliban is a serious threat and stated that Saudi authorities can more easily target al-Qaida financing since the group’s members are frequently Saudi nationals, often with Saudi addresses and phone numbers. Taliban/Haqqani network fundraisers, however, usually enter the Kingdom from Afghanistan or Pakistan, and may use fabricated travel documents, according to Mabahith. Mabahith also acknowledged that the Hajj represents an opportunity for terrorist fundraisers. The same officials further acknowledged the historical ties that existed between Saudi Arabia and the Taliban, suggesting that lingering sympathies may create a potential donor base in the Kingdom.
 
¶5. (S/NF) Mendelsohn stated that senior Taliban officials travel to Saudi Arabia to discuss reconciliation issues, but said they also conduct fundraising activities while in the Kingdom. Mabahith initially responded that Taliban reconciliation issues were handled by the GIP and stated that the Mabahith has very little insight or coordination with the GIP in this area. After further discussion, Issa said that even if Taliban fundraisers travel to Saudi Arabia under the auspices of reconciliation, Mabahith officials would arrest anyone who breaks Saudi law while in the Kingdom.
 
¶6. (S/NF) Treasury analysts provided information on  XXXXXXXXXXXX three senior Taliban officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to Saudi Arabia, according to U.S. intelligence. (NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange included telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and passport information for crosschecking against Saudi customs databases. END NOTE.) Mabahith was not familiar with the individuals and pledged to follow up on the identifying information provided by GRPO and Treasury. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates known either to reside in or travel to the Saudi Arabia.
 
¶7. (S/NF) Reviewing a list of several full or partial names of suspected Taliban donors in the Kingdom, Mabahith recognized XXXXXXXXXXXX, a prominent Saudi who reportedly gave XXXXXXXXXXXX $30,000 in September 2008. Mabahith had no information regarding XXXXXXXXXXXX’s financial contributions to the Taliban, but speculated that the money could have come from a trust or a charity that was associated with XXXXXXXXXXXX, rather than from XXXXXXXXXXXX himself. Mabahith pledged to investigate XXXXXXXXXXXX and stated that it would not hesitate to “press him” regardless of his social status. Mendelsohn emphasized the importance of taking actions to delegitimize Taliban fundraising, just as the Saudi government has worked hard to delegitimize al-Qaida and deter donors from giving money to the group.
 
¶8. (S/NF) Mabahith also detailed the SAG’s new fingerprinting system. Mabahith suggested that the system will likely be more effective against Taliban fundraisers, who travel through official points of entry, than it will be against al-Qaida-affiliated foreign fighters, who enter the country illegally. Mabahith also stated that this system should reduce the effectiveness of forged travel documents used at official points of entry. They pointed out the country’s large borders, highlighting the continuing challenges they expect to encounter.
(S/NF) Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna
 
¶9. (S/NF) Mendelsohn also raised USG concerns about Pakistan-based extremist group Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ) and its involvement in attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan. GRPO and Treasury passed names and other identifying information of suspected Saudi Arabia-based JDQ donors and affiliates. Mabahith pledged to investigate the names and follow up through intelligence channels.
(U) Al-Haramain Foundation
 
¶10. (S/NF) Mendelsohn commended Mabahith for its successful operations exposing and disrupting the terrorist support activities of the Saudi-based NGO al-Haramain Foundation (AHF), and pledged USG support for their investigation. Mabahith confirmed that more than 40 AHF-affiliated individuals had been arrested as a result and that Mabahith had a strong case against former AHF Director Aqil al-Aqil. Mabahith candidly noted that Saudi authorities were embarrassed about the way they had handled Aqil al-Aqil, since they had previously arrested and released him based on an earlier lack of evidence.
 
SMITH


Private individuals in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states friendly to the United States are the chief source of funding for al-Qaida, the Taliban and other terrorist groups, according to leaked U.S. diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks.

 
Gulf states are 'chief source' of al-Qaida funding: Wikileaks It has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to stop funding terrorist financing all of which is emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority," read a cable from Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State, dated December 30, 2009.
 
"Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide," added the document.
 
The Saudis have recognized that they have trouble policing the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, when it is estimated that millions of dollars are raised for militants who send agents into the oil-rich kingdom under the cover of Muslim pilgrims.
 
The Saudi interior ministry co-operated when terrorist funding was brought to its attention, but remained "almost completely dependent on the CIA to provide analytic support and direction for its counterterrorism operations", said a cable from the U.S. embassy in Riyadh. "As such, our success against terrorist financing in the kingdom remains directly tied to our ability to provide actionable intelligence to our Saudi counterparts."
 
There was no accusation of official Saudi government support of militants, not yet but it could be known if more documents were released on this issue.
T
he Clinton memo credited the Saudis with "significant progress" under U.S. pressure to deal with the issue, especially disrupting al-Qaida's finance channels.
However, it claimed that "Riyadh has taken only limited action" to interrupt the flow of money to Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and associated groups which have launched attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. It believed that private funds from Arab states were the Taliban's greatest source of income, above revenues from the opium-poppy trade. So why are not the feilds being burned to the ground.
 
The tiny kingdom of Qatar, which was last week granted the right to stage the 2022 World Cup, was singled out as the "worst in the region" in terms of its co-operation with the U.S.. Qatar's approach on militant financing is "largely passive," and its security services "have been hesitant to act against known terrorists" because they fear being seen too close to the United States, the memo said.
 
Kuwait, which was saved from Saddam Hussein's invasion by U.S.-led forces in 1991, was a "key transit point" for funds that were threatening stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan and targeting coalition soldiers. It dismissed U.S. requests for help in limiting the activities of a charity as "draconian" and based on weak evidence.
 
Mrs. Clinton said the key challenge for U.S. diplomacy was to create the "political will" in the Gulf to clamp down on terrorist financing.
 
Unlike George W Bush, President Barack Obama has rarely made public comments about the issue, preferring to work through diplomatic channels. Even though, Saudi Arabia is the key source of funding for radical Islamist groups including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hamas, according to US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks on Sunday.

Other Gulf states are also important to militant fundraising, the documents say, which brand Gulf states Qatar and Kuwait as notably lax in pursuing locals who donate to the groups.

And Saudi Arabia is particularly challenged by policing money transfers during the hajj and umrah pilgrimages, with militants sending agents into the oil-rich kingdom under the cover of pious Muslim pilgrims, they say.

Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide," said the document, an assessment from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dated December 30, 2009.

"Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba), and other terrorist groups, including Hamas, which probably raise millions of dollars annually from Saudi sources, often during Hajj and Ramadan," the cable said.
There was no accusation of official Saudi government support of militants.

However, it added, "Riyadh has taken only limited action" to interrupt the flow of money to Taliban and LeT-associated groups which have launched attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Other Gulf states also remain important sources of financing for Islamist militants, singling out Qatar as "the worst in the region" in its cooperation with Washington.

Qatar's approach on militant financing is "largely passive," and its security services "have been hesitant to act against known terrorists" because they fear being seen too close to the United States, it said.

The same document said Kuwait has been "less inclined to take action" on local financiers and facilitators plotting attacks outside the country.
Documents released by WikiLeaks on Sunday and earlier showed the strong push Washington has made on Gulf allies to crack down on money going to the Taliban and LeT in addition to Al-Qaeda.

They revealed that Washington thinks private donations from the Gulf are the main source of Taliban funds, and not the narcotics trade.
But the documents suggest that Gulf governments had not paid much attention to the Taliban issue, and were heavily dependent on US intelligence.
The documents depict US officials handing over data on suspected Taliban fund-raisers to Gulf counterparts, who were not aware of the names provided.
The Saudi interior ministry "remains almost completely dependent on the CIA to provide analytic support and direction for its counterterrorism operations," said a

February cable from the US embassy in Riyadh.

As such, our success against terrorist financing in the kingdom remains directly tied to our ability to provide actionable intelligence to our Saudi counterparts."
But US documents praised the Saudis for their cooperation, including arresting "more than 40 individuals" from the Al-Haramain Foundation, a sprawling charity Washington has alleged supports Al-Qaeda.

In the past two years Riyadh has passed a law and issued an official fatwa, or religious edict, against donating to designated terror groups.

But speaking about militant financing, Saudi officials themselves admit that the annual hajj pilgrimage is "a vacuum in our security," one 2009 document noted.
Likewise, the Arabic newspaper Asharq al-Awsat reported on Saturday, citing Saudi security sources, that militants recently arrested in Saudi Arabia had used the cover of raising funds for flood relief in Pakistan in recent months to get money for Al-Qaeda.