This document presents the meeting report for the Bilderberg meeting of 1962, that took place from May 18-20 at the Grand Hotel Saltsjöbaden in Saltsjöbaden, Sweden.

The Bilderberg Group, Bilderberg conference, or Bilderberg Club is an "off the record" meeting of around 130 transatlantic political and military leaders, business and banking executives, royalty and other power elites. It has been meeting annually since 1954. Despite its influence on postwar history, which arguably eclipses that of the G8 conference, it does not not have a web site and nor does it publicly release records of its meetings.

This year's meeting is stated to be in Greece from 14 May 2009-16 May 2009.

For background on the group's activities, see this BBC radio 4 report and this Asia Times article.

The documents in this series were housed by Dynbase, a subscription only biographical, genealogical, and organizational database, which became defunct in 2006.

This document presents the meeting report for the Bilderberg meeting of 1957, that took place from October 4-6 at the Grand Hotel Palazzo della Fonte in Fiuggi, Italy

The Bilderberg Group, Bilderberg conference, or Bilderberg Club is an "off the record" meeting of around 130 transatlantic political and military leaders, business and banking executives, royalty and other power elites. It has been meeting annually since 1954. Despite its influence on postwar history, which arguably eclipses that of the G8 conference, it does not not have a web site and nor does it publicly release records of its meetings.

This year's meeting is stated to be in Greece from 14 May 2009-16 May 2009.

For background on the group's activities, see this BBC radio 4 report and this Asia Times article.

The documents in this series were housed by Dynbase, a subscription only biographical, genealogical, and organizational database, which became defunct in 2006.

BILDERBERG GROUP

FIUGGI CONFERENCE

4-6 October 1957 (Participant list has been moved to a separate file)

INTRODUCTION

The sixth Bilderberg Conference met at Fiuggi, Italy. The first five were held in the

Netherlands, France, Germany, Denmark, and the United States.

A number of persons who had indicated their intentions of attending were prevented

from doing so at the last minute by Asian influenza. Forty-five persons attended from

eleven different countries; whatever their status or function in public life they all took part

in a purely personal capacity. Like all other meetings of the Bilderberg Group this

Conference set as its purpose the frank discussion of problems of common concern to the

nations of the Western alliance. Its members were all informed persons of authority and

influence in their respective countries. Since difficulties and differences are bound to arise

among any group of democratic peoples which believes in the right of dissent, the

Bilderberg Group aims at contributing towards a reconciliation of divergent views and

interests by providing the opportunity of free discussion among leaders of opinion who

share a common desire to achieve a better understanding of one another's motives and

intentions.

For this reason, the subjects chosen for discussion at Bilderberg Conferences mainly

concern questions on which the Western Alliance may have difficulty in agreeing. Fruitful

discussion requires an atmosphere of mutual trust, so that participants can express

themselves in complete frankness. This has been largely achieved at all the Bilderberg

Conferences because the meetings are held in private, the press and public are excluded

and neither background papers nor speeches are published. In the final printed report,

including the present one, opinions are summarized and speakers are not quoted by name.

The Conferences of the Bilderberg Group do not aim to formulate policy or even reach

conclusions—no resolutions are submitted for discussion or voted upon. The purpose of

the debate is to present a comprehensive review of the problems on the Agenda from

which each participant is free to draw his own conclusions. It is hoped, however, that as a

result those who attend the meetings may be better equipped to use their influence so that

the Atlantic alliance may function better.

The main items on the Agenda of the sixth Bilderberg Conference were as follows:

1 Survey of developments since the last Bilderberg Conference.

2. Modern weapons and disarmament in relation to Western security.

(a) The impact of technological progress in armaments on strategy and

diplomacy.

(b) Limitation of armaments and the effect of it on NATO.

2 Are existing political and economic mechanisms within the WesternCommunity

adequate ?

Background papers were circulated before the meeting to provide information or the

discussion or to focus debate on particular issues. Following normal custom, as each new

subject was broached, the authors of the relevant papers opened the discussion by

commenting upon them.

The Bilderberg Conferences are held throughout in plenary session so that any member

may participate in any of the discussions. Advantage is also derived from the

opportunities for informal conversation outside the conference room among participants,

who spend three days living together in the same hotel away Tom the distractions of the

city.

I. GENERAL SURVEY

The Conference began with a general discussion of international developments since

the previous meeting at St. Simons Island, Georgia, in February. The main themes of this

discussion were political developments in the Communist bloc and the Middle East, and

economic developments in the free world.

The opening speaker analysed recent changes inside the Soviet leadership and

compared the position and methods of Khrushchev with those of Stalin. Khrushchev must

be seen as personifying the Communist Party element in the Soviet ruling class. He had

first liquidated Beria so that the Party could regain control over the police. He demoted

Malenkov so that the managerial bureaucracy could be subordinated to the Party—this

was also the main purpose of the economic decentralization carried out earlier this year.

The elimination of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich from the ruling group was

accompanied by the old Stalinist technique of enlarging the most important Party organs

so that they could be packed with the leaders' nominees. Though many observers expected

the recent changes to mean a strengthening of the Red Army's power, the speaker doubted

this on the grounds that whenever the Army seeks to strengthen its influence in a State it

is the Majors and Colonels and seldom the Field Marshals who are behind it. It was

doubtful whether the present Army leaders in Russia were capable of exerting much

influence.*

There was every reason to believe that the Communist Party was now firmly in control

of Soviet policy. As long as this situation lasted, the attitudes resulting from Party

predominance in domestic affairs would determine Soviet policy abroad. There was no

ground for hoping that recent changes in the Soviet leadership would produce an

improvement in East-West relations.

It was easier to interpret the trend of Soviet policy by comparing the relative strengths

of the two power blocs. Perhaps Khrushchev was taking more risks in foreign policy

because he felt the Soviet position to be stronger—witness Russia's lead in the I.C.B.M.

and the Sputnik.

One of the speakers believed that domestic problems were far more important to the

Russian leaders than external problems—the former determining Soviet policy on the

latter. There was disagreement in the Conference, however, concerning the nature of the

interaction between domestic and foreign policy in Russia. Though Soviet foreign policy

appeared to be tougher now than before, the internal system was subject to serious

pressures and weaknesses. New social forces were beginning to exert a direct influence on

Government behaviour—in particular the intelligentsia, the younger generation, and the

managerial middle class. One result was an increasing demand for consumer goods which

already faced the Russian leadership with difficult economic problems. The demands on

the Soviet economy were now so large and numerous that it was doubtful whether the

present system could satisfy them all.

One of the participants felt that for this reason the West should keep Russia under

economic pressure by maintaining the arms race, which put much more serious burdens

on the Soviet Union than competition between East and West in aid to the underdeveloped

areas. Other participants, however, maintained that, since Russia now had a

lead of four to one over the West in ground forces on the European continent, she could

afford to reduce her margin of superiority considerably in this field without losing her

capacity for military pressure or direct aggression. Other participants showed concern that

in fact the West had been disarming unilaterally during the year without attempting to

obtain military or political concessions from the Russians in return. (Some of the points

made concerning defence and disarmament during the preliminary discussion will be

recorded below in section III.)

Many participants referred to the setbacks suffered by Communism in Western Europe

where Communist Party strength was at its lowest since the Second World War; its losses

among the intellectuals, mainly as a result of events in Hungary and Poland, were

particularly important. Russia's position was also much weaker in the satellite countries.

One of the participants described the situation in Poland, which he had recently visited.

He pointed out that it was now possible to establish economic and cultural contacts in

many fields with the inhabitants of the satellite countries. Several other speakers also

stressed the political gains which might follow economic co-operation with Eastern

Europe. These countries must be shown that they need not rely exclusively on the Soviet

Union for economic aid. One of the participants pointed out that this might also be true in

China. Several speakers pointed out that the West was still unprepared for a repetition of

the upheavals which occurred last year in Poland and Hungary. As regards Poland, there

was still much hesitation in the West about the desirability of granting economic aid. We

still had no policy for dealing with another explosion on the Hungarian model. This hiatus

in our policy gravely weakened our propaganda to these countries.

One of the German participants referred to the Polish-German problem and in

particular to the Oder-Neisse line as a factor which helped to keep Poland inside the

Soviet bloc. He was confident that it would be possible to find a satisfactory solution for

what was fundamentally a legacy of Hitler's war. While Germany would have to renounce

her legal claims, she should not be called upon to make unilateral concessions, even

though, when it came to negotiations, Germany might have to give up far more than

Poland. Both parties should be less intransigent on this question. It should be possible to

reach an agreement along the lines of that already reached between Germany and France.

While Russia had lost ground on the European front she had gained substantially in

the Middle East. One of the participants maintained that it was not sufficiently realized

that the problem here was not Communism as a political doctrine but Russia as a

diplomatic influence. Syria, for example, was not turning Communist—it would be

quite misleading to compare her with the satellite states in Eastern Europe. But Syria

was becoming a vassal state of the Soviet Union under the control of Russian agents

and nominees.

Russia had used her arms deliveries to extend her political influence. The Army, in

particular the armoured units and the intelligence service, were in the hands of Russian

stooges and this was enough to give Russia a decisive influence inside the Syrian

Government. Russia's ultimate goals in the Middle East were to encircle Turkey, to evict

the West from its military bases, and to cut its oil supply and deny it the free use of the

Suez Canal. The West, therefore, must support Turkey and secure its oil supplies by

building super-tankers and additional pipelines through Turkey. One of the participants

believed we should also have to revise our attitude towards Colonel Nasser, however

disagreeable this might be. It was pointed out that most of the tonnage which has been

recently added to the world tanker fleet was being registered under the flags of Panama or

Liberia; it was thus not under direct control by the Western Governments, and in case of

crisis it could well be withdrawn to serve other clients. It was generally agreed that the

Western countries should have a common policy in the Middle East, particularly since

they all suffered the same serious limitations in their freedom of action. For example, they

were committed to preserve Israel as a separate state in the Middle East although the

Arabs considered Israel as their main enemy. Thus they could not play the card of Arab

nationalism so successfully as Russia. As crisis succeeded crisis in the area, the West had

never been able to develop and clarify a general line of policy for the Middle East. One of

the major difficulties was the indiscriminate spread of arms among the Arab states and

Israel. Some participants felt that the West should explore the possibility of reaching

agreement on an arms embargo in the Middle East. Others felt the possibility of such an

agreement was so remote that it was not worth jeopardizing relations with our Arab allies

in order to achieve it.

It had to be admitted that though the Western countries agreed in principle on the need

for a common policy in the Middle East, they were still far from having achieved it. Each

Western country tended to choose one Middle Eastern state as its particular client and to

pursue friendship with it at the expense of good relations with the area as a whole. Britain

had Iraq, America had Saudi Arabia, France had Israel, and now Italy had Persia, yet

many of these states used the assistance they received from their protectors to pursue

private conflicts with the clients of other Western powers. The recent trouble in Oman

was a good example.

One participant felt that in inheriting the position of Britain and France as the

predominant Western Powers in the Middle East, the United States had copied some of

the political errors of its predecessors, in particular an over-reliance on the old ruling

classes which were bound to disappear in the near future. It was a mistake to rely on the

artificial patriotism of the royal families rather than the nationalism of the rising classes,

which gave much more importance to the concept of Pan-Arab unity than to the existing

state boundaries. Other speakers pointed out that however desirable it might be in theory

for the West to identify itself with the revolutionary groups in the Arab world, in practice

we had to accept the political situation as it was today and co-operate with whatever

groups were in power. Moreover, in some cases the old ruling groups contained the most

progressive and constructive elements.

In this respect as in others the real disagreement in the Conference was on the

priority of long-term policies as against short-term expedients. No one denied the

necessity for American intervention during the Jordan crisis, but some participants felt

that the success of this intervention had misled America into imagining that it was a

precedent which could be followed successfully elsewhere. In the long run the West

must find some better way of making contact with the broad mass of Arab opinion and

with the political and social groups which represented it in practice. Several

participants drew attention to the serious shortcomings of Western propaganda to the

Arab world. Cairo Radio still had an overwhelming influence in the Middle East.

Whatever could and should be done to cope with immediate crises as they arose, the

West must try to develop a long-term policy. It looked as though the Eisenhower

doctrine, which had been welcomed at the last Conference as evidence of a positive

American concern with the area, was already losing its rele vance in the military field.

In the economic field, however, it remained valid and several participants felt that this

was the most promising field for Western initiative. One speaker stressed the

importance of a regional approach in the Middle East. So long as the area was treated

as a mosaic of separate economic entities, there was little scope for fruitful

intervention. Several participants called for a new Western effort to solve the problem

of the Arab refugees, as a major obstacle to better relations between the Arab states and

Israel.

It was pointed out, however, that economic development in the Middle East raised the

same problems as in Asia or indeed in Europe during the Industrial Revolution. If the

backward peoples were given access to modern techniques and to a twentieth-century

standard of life, they must also be guided towards political democracy, otherwise the

social chaos created by rapid economic development would provide Communism with

new opportunities. For this reason one of the speakers believed that the problems of the

Middle East should be seen in conjunction with those of similar areas in Asia, and more

should be done to link the problems of the Far East and Middle East together.

It was impossible to discuss such problems as defence and overseas development

without considering the impact of these expenditures on the domestic economy of the

Western Powers. Reviewing the situation in the United States, one of the participants

said there had been considerable development both in the depth and breadth of the

American economy. The chief problem now was to maintain stability in economic

growth. There was a close relationship between a stable currency and stability of

employment. People realized that inflation must lead to a "Bust" and to mass

unemployment. In its rapid economic development since the Second World War,

America faced a new set of problems. As a result of past experience, many defences

against depression had been built into the economic structure, but there was less

protection against inflation. Economically, the USA was still fighting the last war. All

of the Western countries now had to decide how great a demand they could place on

their economies and how much they could pay themselves for what they did. We must

examine our national budgets, our credit policies and our price support policies in the

light of the pace at which our economies could develop. Unless we preserved

flexibility

and resilience in our economies, they might collapse under the strain of built-in

inefficiencies and inflation-encrusted costs. We must aim at stable economic growth

with rates of expansion which could sustain an improvement in our living standards,

support our defence establishments, and make reserves available for the

underdeveloped

parts of the world. We should approach this task confident that it could be done

without

a steady attrition of our currency. Experience would prove whether our confidence

was

justified. The speaker felt sure our economies were strong enough to accept the

measures of restraint which might be necessary to keep inflationary tendencies under

control.

Though there was general agreement on the desirability of halting inflation, some

participants doubted whether in practice it was possible to maintain a stable level of

prices at the same time as full employment, i.e. a high pressure of demand on the

labour

market. Wages were not, however, the only inflationary factor to be considered. Some

of

the speakers discussed the shortage of savings and the role of Government expenditure

and credit policies. This was particularly important for the under-developed countries

which had to fight against heavy internal demand and were disappointed at the meagre

supplies of capital trickling from the huge Western reservoir.

One of the American participants believed that in spite of current talk of a recession,

inflation was still the biggest long-term danger to the American economy, since it was

still fundamentally expansionist; in fact present rumours of a business recession were

probably mainly due to the measures the Government had introduced against an inflation

which threatened America's defence posture as well as the basic health of her economy.

There was, however, also some excess capacity, mainly in manufacturing industries, and a

consequent decline in stock prices had caused some apprehension. Certain industries were

particularly weak, for example housing, mineral mining, and the automobile industry. The

speaker felt that during the past few years the American economy had tried to grow too

fast and the price level had risen more than it should. Thus, in 1958, the gross national

product in real terms might level off if it did not actually decline, although in money

terms it would probably be several billion dollars higher than it was in 1956. Though this

pause might be healthy and desirable in itself, there was a danger that psychological

factors might carry it further than was econo-mically justifiable, but on the whole he felt

confident since basically the American economy was strong and the trends were ''bullish".

Besides discussing economic integration in Europe in its opening session, the

Conference spent some time at the end of its agenda in considering the European

Common Market and Free Trade Area. The whole of this discussion is summarized

below. In general, the American participants welcomed the creation of a European

Common Market and Atomic Pool. They stressed, however, that the economic benefits of

the Common Market would depend on its looking outwards and not inwards. If the

Common Market led to the formation of a self-centred economic bloc, it could do severe

political and economic harm to the broader development of the free world as a whole.

Indeed, American tariff policy would be influenced by the way in which the Common

Market handled similar problems, and the trend inside Europe would have a direct bearing

on the attitude of the USA as expressed in the legislative programme on foreign trade

shortly to come before Congress.

Another speaker believed that, in general, forward-looking business and industrial

circles in America saw the Common Market as creating opportunities rather than

obstacles. Exporters, however, took a more realistic view, and expected not only

increased competition but also an increase in quantitative restrictions" on dollar imports.

For various reasons the different measures of integration proposed would probably

influence the behaviour of firms well before they came to be implemented. It was

expected that the Common Market would encourage industrial concentration in Europe

and accelerate penetration of American markets. Conversely American industry would

find it harder to compete in Europe. As a result Americans were beginning to contemplate

increased direct investment , in European industry, mainly as partners contributing capital

and, when necessary, technical know-how. There was a danger that protectionist elements

in the United States might draw fresh strength from these developments.

Participants from the countries directly involved, however, felt that these fears would

prove to be unfounded. The Common Market would be implemented by easy stages and,

if the experience of Benelux was any guide, trade with the outside world would increase

together with internal trade. They were confident that the Common Market would be a

step towards greater freedom in world trade as a whole. This was the purpose of the plan,

although in some cases adjustments had had to be made so that particular interests would

not be too drastically affected. Now that the internal pattern had been settled in the

Common Market Treaty, attention would concentrate increasingly on relations with third

countries ; the Free Trade Area would be the next step in the process of European

economic integration. One of the European participants from outside the Common Market

area said that his country, while sharing some of the American apprehensions regarding

the Common Market, hoped that a way could be found of grafting the Free Trade Area on

to it. The main obstacle to British and Scandinavian participation in the Common Market

was its function as a step towards political union among the countries concerned. It would

not be easy, however, for third countries to associate with the Common Market even for

economic purposes, since the Common Market represented a delicate balance between the

interests of its members, which might be disturbed by the addition of further countries.

There was also the problem of including agriculture, which for countries like Denmark

was of fundamental importance. Difficulties also arose over the techniques required to

operate a Free Trade Area, particularly a watertight system for Certificates of Origin.

Nonetheless the political desire for a Free Trade Area as an addition to the Common

Market was so strong that these difficulties should be overcome.

(/) Other Developments

Several references were made to the crisis at Little Rock over schools segregation.

While no one was disposed to underestimate the damaging consequences of these events

on opinion in the uncommitted areas, all the European participants agreed that in Europe

the American Administration had won credit for its stand and that the incident was rightly

seen in the context of the general trend in the United States against racial discrimination.

Several American participants, however, while expressing appreciation for the

understanding shown by the responsible press and public opinion in Europe, expressed

misgivings about the consequences inside the United States, in particular the revival of

Civil War memories and increased racial tension in the Northern States as larger numbers

of negroes cross the Mason-Dixon line.

II. ARE EXISTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE

WESTERN COMMUNITY ADEQUATE?

This discussion was mainly concerned with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

European institutions attracted less attention, partly because they did not immediately

concern the American participants.

There was general concern that while the Communist bloc benefited from central

strategic planning in world affairs, the Western Governments had been unable to achieve

comparable unity. There was no overall co-ordination of policies nor had any attempt

been made to establish a machinery for this.

Several participants emphasized the need for a clear definition of priorities in Western

policy. One speaker suggested that the general aim of Western policy should be to

produce a shift in Soviet policy from an aggressive attempt to force Communism on the

rest of the world to one of "live-and-let-live". Rational argument would not achieve this

without physical pressure exerted by Western military strength and unrest in the satellite

states. The military and economic strength of Western Europe, in particular, would have a

direct impact on developments inside the Communist bloc; in this respect the creation of

the Common Market and of greater European unity would be of considerable

consequence. All forms of contact with the Communist bloc particularly on the personal

level should be encouraged.

Second only to this we should show sincere interest in the progress of the twenty-one

new nation states of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. If their help could be enlisted, they

might exert considerable pressure; this had already been seen during the United Nations

debate on Hungary. The Soviet concept of peaceful and competitive co-existence should

be taken up by the West since it offered a better field on which to meet the Soviet

challenge. There was general agreement that this formulation of Western objectives

should determine the allocation of Western resources. One of the participants argued that

we should concentrate first on strengthening our own military and economic position,

since our own survival and the safety and prosperity of our friends depended on it. After

this we should concentrate on those areas which had a direct bearing on our strength and

security. We could not afford to waste our limited resources and it was dangerous to

encourage expectations which we could not fulfil.

Though the Conference agreed on the reality of this danger, as borne out by recent

increases in the bank rate throughout the Western world, a number of speakers felt that

the new countries of the Middle East and Asia deserved a higher priority in Western

policy.

One of the speakers suggested that our main task was to prevent any expansion of

Soviet influence beyond its present geographical limits, and that this required great

courage and determination from the West. The Soviet leaders did not hesitate to use

threats and the West must be ready to respond in kind. Moreover, we must be in a position

to carry out any threats we made, since we could never afford to bluff. In fact, however,

the risks of having to implement a threat were much smaller than they superficially

appeared. In general, our policy should be more carefully worked out and more energetic.

Time and again, Russia took the initiative so that we were compelled to fight battles in

conditions of her choosing. The general framework of NATO was the best place for

elaborating an active policy, though we need not necessarily always make use of its

machinery. Once we had decided on a policy we should not, as so often in the past, be too

easily shaken into seeking new postures and new formulas.

It was generally agreed that the central problem was to ensure that nations held proper

consultations inside NATO before taking decisions which might affect other members of

the alliance. Although the machinery itself might be perfectly adequate, and juridical

obligations observed, NATO could break up like similar alliances in the past if members

were drawn apart by divergent policies outside the area of NATO's direct concern.

Although NATO was the only institution which covered all countries in the Western

alliance, its members had a wider range of interests which extended beyond NATO's

juridical limits. Outside Europe, the interests of members of the alliance differed in

importance and were sometimes divergent—for example on the colonial problem—yet

the alliance as a whole might be affected by actions of one of its members in an area

where its direct interest was greater than that of its allies—for example in the Far East.

Thus consultation on national policies was highly desirable. A distinction must be made,

however, between issues of direct juridical concern to NATO on which unanimity was

required in concerting a common policy, and issues outside NATO's immediate concern

where the object of consultation was to discover whether national policy was compatible

with, or at least not con trary to, the interests of other member states. In the latter case,

unanimity was not essential and consultation need not necessarily lead to agreement. The

major Powers, whose responsibilities extended beyond the area of the alliance, were

committed to consulting their partners but not necessarily to agreeing with them. This

distinction was probably inevitable; but the smaller countries often feared and resented

the possibility that they might be involved by the actions of their bigger partners without

their consent and without proper regard to their views.

There was no criticism of NATO's institutional machinery as such. It was adequate so

long as it operated within the limits set by common interests and common aims. But once

the interests or policies of the member states began to diverge, NATO'S machinery was

paralysed and could not impose a solution. Responsibility for deciding policy rested on

the national Governments and NATO was only their instrument. Some participants felt

that this problem could only be solved by a formal transfer of sovereignty along federal

lines. It was suggested, however, that although NATO was technically the instrument of

an alliance of sovereign states, in some respects it went further in a federal direction.

In this connection reference was made to the Council of Europe and other European

institutions where the unanimity rule in the Ministerial Councils was being slowly eroded

and more and more questions were being decided by majorities; moreover, objecting

countries were allowed to contract out of certain agreements. Perhaps this habit could also

be introduced into the North Atlantic Council.

Several participants stressed, however, that the present situation in NATO did not give

ground for serious concern. There was strong moral pressure on small minorities to

comply with majority feeling and in practice this was usually effective. Providing

NATO's consultative machinery was properly used it could give satisfactory results even

in major matters. Everyone agreed, for example, in praising NATO's role in working out

common Western proposals during the disarmament negotiations.

One of the biggest problems was to secure adequate consultation within NATO during

the formulation of American foreign policy. This must be done at an early stage, since it

was very difficult for the alliance to change an American policy which had already been

decided.

working of the NATO Secretariat and of the Council of permanent representatives. The

Secretary-General could exert a considerable influence as spokesman for the interests of

the alliance as a whole. It was important that the rank and standing of members of the

Council should be high so that they could exert real influence on their respective

Governments. One of the participants emphasized that they should also be in a position to

reach those centres of opinion in their own countries which were concerned with making

foreign policy. This was not so much a question of general propaganda as of establishing

influence with those who formed opinion in the various countries. At the same time most

participants agreed that NATO could be made more effective if the member Governments

would delegate greater powers to their permanent representatives.

It was felt by one speaker that NATO should and could take a stronger line in dealing

with sectional interests. It was much too easy at present for individual countries to act

against the common interest, to hold up decisions, or to impose their own solutions

without being held up to proper criticism. NATO must establish higher standards of

behaviour in this respect.

Recruitment of members to the NATO Secretariat could be improved. Unlike most of

the European institutions, NATO was staffed by Civil Servants on loan from member

Governments for comparatively short periods. Thus it was difficult for them to oppose

departments into which they would soon be reintegrated. They would have more

independence if they could find a permanent career in an international Civil Service or in

a permanent NATO staff. Other speakers felt that this was not a major problem. On the

whole, NATO's staffing was satisfactory. Members of the Secretariat always acted on

behalf of, or on instructions from, the Secretary-General; thus they benefited from his

personal prestige. Moreover, while the Secretary-General presided over meetings of the

Council as a whole, members of the Secretariat took the chair at its various committees

and could thus exert considerable influence.

One of the participants suggested that the NATO countries should formally agree to

submit their disputes to the International Court at the Hague. Whatever its practical

importance, this would set a useful example to the newly independent countries of the

world.

The Conference made a short review of the machinery for dealing with economic

problems inside the alliance, and there was general agreement that this had worked

satisfactorily, although the need was felt for consultation on matters of financial policy.

III. MODERN WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT IN RELATION TO WESTERN

SECURITY

This discussion was mainly concerned with the implications of Russia's newlyacquired

ability to respond in kind against massive nuclear retaliation by the West—a

problem often referred to as the thermo-nuclear stalemate. One participant pointed out

that the phrase "thermo-nuclear stalemate" was not well chosen. It was rather a question

of "stand-offs" developing at various levels of strategy: for example, Russia's ability to

neutralize America's strategic thermonuclear power at present depended not only on her

capacity for direct air-atomic attack on the United States but also on her naval power to

cut off the NATO forces in Europe from their main base and source of supply in the

Western hemisphere.

However, it was generally agreed that Russia's capacity for thermo-nuclear attack on

American territory had made the threat of massive thermo-nuclear retaliation less

convincing as a deterrent. There was a growing gap between the policy of deterrence and

a strategy which the West might be willing to implement if deterrence failed—a gap

between the total military strength of the West and Western willingness to use this

strength to the full. The problem for Western statesmen was therefore to develop

alternatives to a massive retaliation which would provide the West in any crisis with a

spectrum of possibilities between doing nothing and destroying the human race. One

participant suggested that the West must develop a strategy of denial in local war rather

than destruction in all-out war, and that the pattern of future conflict would be short,

sharp clashes in the area concerned accompanied by negotiations between the two sides

for a settlement; this would be as much a test of will as a test of military power.

Though it was generally agreed that it was desirable to aim at such a spectrum of

military possibilities, there was argument about the feasibility of limiting any war which

involved both Russian and American troops directly. One participant held that, given the

absolute weapon, war did not necessarily run to maximum destructiveness, but the

limitation of war depended on its political objectives rather than the weapons used.

Moreover, though enemy agreement was required for any limitation in war, this

agreement was likely to be implicit, as in Korea, rather than explicit, as suggested by

some advocates of "graduated deterrence".

Several speakers pointed out that in any case the problem of limiting war could arise

separately from the problem of deterrence. Wars could break out by spontaneous

combustion, as in Hungary, or through the action of small Powers, or through

irrationality in the Governments of large Powers; in such cases a policy of deterrence

might be irrelevant. Moreover there was the possibility that Russia might deliberately

organize a local aggression in order to test the West's will and capacity to resist. If the

West was incapable of halting such an aggression by limited warfare and did not feel

the

issue justified all-out thermo-nuclear annihilation, Russia could use her success to win

further diplomatic victories without the physical use of her military power.

Thus the West must develop the capacity to smother or control little wars without

involving the world in a thermo-nuclear holocaust. The most difficult problem was to

decide whether it was possible to limit the use of atomic weapons or whether atomic

weapons must be reserved exclusively for all-out war. One speaker gave examples of the

way in which atomic warfare could be limited in terms of the theatre involved, the targets

attacked and the weapons employed. Another argued that it was impossible and

unnecessary to draw up general rules for the limitation of atomic warfare; in practice it

was necessary and possible to solve the problem only in a small number of theatres, round

the Sino-Soviet periphery. Moreover, providing Western confidence in the possibility of

limiting atomic war was sufficient to remove inhibitions against the use of atomic

weapons, the residual uncertainty as to whether in fact limitations could be maintained

would only add to the deterrent. Thus NATO's decision to use "tactical" atomic weapons

in Central Europe could be seen both as suggesting local atomic defence as an alternative

to massive thermo-nuclear retaliation and as increasing the strength of the "tripwire"

which would trigger off massive retaliation by automatically raising the stakes at issue in

any Soviet aggression. It gave Russia no option between leaving NATO alone and starting

with a major atomic attack to wipe out NATO's tactical nuclear bases.

One participant, however, disputed the possibility of limiting any direct conflict

between two atomic Powers, holding that the real problem-was to clarify the point at

which aggression would be met by all-out war, any attack below this point being met by

conventional forces. When one speaker pointed to the Korean war as demonstrating the

possibility of limitation even in the use of conventional weapons, another drew the

opposite conclusions from the same evidence, arguing that the Korean war was limited

only because atomic weapons were not used and because the Soviet Union did not

directly confront the United States. Some speakers felt that the Soviet Government would

never accept local defeat as an alternative to extending war, another cited Soviet

withdrawals in Iran, Berlin, and Korea to prove the contrary.

There was some disagreement on how a strategy of limited war would affect the

existing Western alliances. One speaker argued that the concept of an alliance was

fundamentally incompatible with the localization of a conflict, since the aim of an alliance

in peacetime was to convince the enemy that aggression would confront him with a

coalition of overwhelming strength. Another held that those members of an alliance who

were most exposed to attack could not reasonably reject a strategy involving heavy

destruction in the battle zone if their only alternative was even heavier destruction for

mankind as a whole. Nevertheless, it was generally agreed that whether or not NATO

turned to a strategy of limited war the Russo-American ' 'stand-off" made it politically and

strategically dangerous to leave the instruments of massive thermo-nuclear retaliation

exclusively in the possession of the two countries farthest from the front line. This

consideration led the Conference to discuss the desirability of distributing atomic

weapons more widely inside NATO. One speaker held that since the capacity for massive

retaliation was the real sanction behind limitation of war, no member of the alliance

would feel safe in adopting a policy of limited war unless it held some capacity for

massive retaliation in its own hands. There was, however, much feeling against increasing

the present size of the ''nuclear club". A German participant strongly opposed his own

country possessing small-yield nuclear weapons, partly on the grounds that any attempt to

provide for limited war in Europe would weaken the deterrent effect of massive retaliation

which was the only realistic protection against large-scale Soviet attack. Another

participant felt that general nuclear armament was becoming the only alternative to

general nuclear disarmament: this fact might ultimately provide the needed pressure on

both sides for agreement in the disarmament discussions.

Finally, the Conference discussed the limits which were set on Western arms

expenditure as a whole by economic and political considerations. One participant felt that

the existing limits were too narrow, since Russia was spending 18 per cent of her gross

national product on defence, America only 8|- per cent, Britain 8 per cent, and the other

Western allies even less. Thus the West was compelled to cover its tactical weakness by

willingness to take greater strategic risks. It was generally felt that there would be great

political resistance against any substantial increase in over-all defence expenditure. Some

participants argued, however, that the Western countries might be prepared to increase

their arms budget as part of an over-all shift in policy involving much closer co-operation

between the United States and Western Europe. They argued that as part of such a

package deal the United States might increase its total expenditure on the basic elements

of massive retaliation, such as the Strategic Air Command and Civil Defence, while

Europe increased its expenditure on conventional forces in the hope of providing for local

defence without use of atomic weapons. Another speaker, however, pointed out that

Western Europe could never hope to match the Soviet Union in conventional forces alone;

moreover, the Red Army was already being equipped and reorganized with tactical atomic

weapons and might well initiate their use in local war.

Thus the forces defending Western Europe must in any case be capable of tactical atomic

warfare. He maintained—but his view did not go unchallenged—that to provide

simultaneously for both conventional and atomic ground warfare in Europe was

impossible for strategic as well as economic reasons.

There was general agreement that the negotiations which took place inside NATO to

produce agreed Western proposals for the disarmament talks deserved great praise and

had done much to enhance NATO's prestige. In spite of the difficulties involved in

synchronizing NATO discussions with negotiations in the United Nations Sub-

Committee, the West had on the whole produced its proposals with adequate speed. Both

the Governments concerned and the NATO Secretariat deserved congratulation. Without

this type of consultation the disarmament discussions might have created serious

divergencies between various members of NATO. In particular, the countries which were

not directly engaged in the London negotiations might have felt that their national

interests would not be adequately safeguarded. By avoiding this, NATO had greatly

reduced the dangers inherent in East-West negotiations.

When the UN Sub-Committee discussions began there had been some fear in Europe

that the disarmament negotiations would weaken the defence posture of the West. In fact

they had strengthened NATO. This prompted several participants to argue that East-West

negotiations in general and disarmament talks in particular should be treated not as an

alternative to Western defence policy but as a means of making it more effective. There

was a large measure of agreement as to the need for co-ordinating our defence and

disarmament policies.

Disarmament along the lines of the Western proposals would not have weakened the

defence establishment of NATO, since they aimed not so much at disarmament as at

reducing the level of armaments on both sides. Any arms limitation proposals involved

some risk, but it might be, said one participant, that the risks inherent in the existing

situation were greater than those implied by a compromise with the Russians. He

remarked that the West had a mistaken tendency to consider disarmament proposals

solely in terms of the sacrifices involved in its own strength, while forgetting that the

other side would have to make corresponding concessions. It was too early to decide

whether the London talks had succeeded or failed. Time alone would show whether the

Soviet Union would give our proposals serious consideration. If we regarded our

proposals as sound and reasonable—and the Conference seemed generally agreed that

they were—we should stick to them and be patient, although we should not consider them

as incapable of improvement. While maintaining our official attitude unchanged, we

might privately examine among ourselves the possibility of some new approaches. For

example, we might find that certain elements in the package proposals might vary from

time to time in their relative importance both to ourselves and to the Russians. This

applied particularly to the "open skies" proposal and the question of the "atomic club". In

any case our efforts to reach agreement on disarmament must be sincere and must be seen

to be sincere. This was essential both as regards public opinion in the West and as regards

our partners in the negotiations.

Some participants felt that in the past few years the West had thrown away important

bargaining points on disarmament without receiving anything in return. For example,

proposals for disarmament on the Western side had actually followed unilateral reductions

to a lower level than that proposed.

Several participants felt that the West had given insufficient thought to the possibility

of negotiating on a zone of limited armaments in Central Europe which would involve the

disengagement of Russian and American forces. Even from the strategic point of view a

disarmament agreement along these lines might provide the NATO countries with more

effective defence than a continuation of the existing situation—particularly since the

present division of Germany might provoke a local conflict irrespective of Soviet or

Western intentions. One of the speakers maintained that existing Western defence policy

ruled out German reunification. In any case there was more chance that the Russians

might accept a pilot scheme for disarmament in a dangerous peripheral area like Central

Europe than permit international inspection and control inside her own national

boundaries. Several speakers referred to the dangers inherent in our present defence

posture which created a gulf between the nuclear powers on both sides of the Iron Curtain

and the non-nuclear powers of Western Europe, whose influence was progressively

declining. Moreover, although the possibility of nuclear retaliation was dwindling as each

side lost the capacity for protection against a counter-blow in kind, the possibility of local

conflict involving non-nuclear powers was increasing. This might ultimately impose

intolerable strains on the Western alliance and was a consideration highly relevant to any

disarmament agreement.

PRESS STATEMENT

From 4 October to 6 October 1957, a group of forty-five Europeans and Americans

held a private and unofficial meeting at Fiuggi, Italy.

This "Bilderberg Group" meeting, under the chairmanship of H.R.H. Prince Bernhard

of the Netherlands, covered a wide range of matters of concern to the Western

Community.

While the discussions did not attempt to reach conclusions or to recommend policies,

there was strong emphasis on the desirability of promoting better understanding and more

effective co-ordination among the Western nations in dealing with common problems.

The participants in the meeting came from the United States, Canada, and eleven

European countries. They included members of different political parties, representatives

of business, labour, education, and some government officials. All the participants were

present in a purely personal and unofficial capacity and, in keeping with the private,

though not secret, character of all the "Bilderberg" meetings, no detailed reports of their

discussions will be published.

THE FORMATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST STUDY GROUP

In the course of the debate on Middle Eastern problems, Dr Paul Rykens referred to the

formation of a Middle East Study Group which was formed after the St. Simons Island

Conference with the participation of some members of the Bilderberg Group. It will be

recalled that Mr Eugene Black suggested at St. Simons Island that it might be possible to

organize co-operation between private business in the West and corresponding elements

in the Middle East with a view to furthering the economic development of the area. This

idea met with a favourable response from the Conference, and, as a result of further study

by a number of business people, the Middle East Study Group was formed in Amsterdam

on 26 May 1957. During the following months, the Western Governments concerned have

shown interest, and business circles in Western Europe and the United States have

indicated their support. The Group is mainly composed of industrialists and financiers,

since on the basis of its present plans its main interests will probably centre on these

fields. Although the oil companies have shown a friendly interest in its work, it does not

propose to include oil among its interests. The geographical area it will cover will include

Iran and the Sudan, as well as the Arab countries of the Middle East.

The Study Group has formulated its plans in consultation with the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation, relying

largely on the advice of their experts. The International Bank has also sponsored meetings

between the Management Committee of the Study Group and the principal Arab

representatives who visited Washington for the meeting of the International Monetary

Fund. Following the conversations which then took place, a number of Middle Eastern

countries have invited a Mission of the Study Group to conduct a survey on the spot. This

Mission, composed of Dr Paul Rykens, Chairman of the Study Group, and members of

the Management Committee, Mr George Nebolsine, Mr Hakon Christian-sen, and Mr

Pollens, together with some other members of the Group, plans to visit the Middle East in

the course of October and November.

DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBERS OF NATO

1. Two parallel developments—the extension of the geographical area falling under

Russia's political strategy, and the influence of economic and financial factors within the

field of this strategy—have, I think, carried much weight in fostering the aspirations of

those countries which, although fully conscious of the difficulties and limitations

connected with a further development of NATO's scope, have felt and still feel, in the

interest of all its members, the necessity of broadening the scope as far as practicable.

These countries would appreciate some initiatives aiming at such a goal.

In fact, long after the Communist revolution, the USSR had limited its main political

action almost exclusively to the areas under its direct influence (China is an exceptional

case). Correspondingly, when NATO came into existence its scope was limited to the

European theatre.

It is, for instance, no secret that the Goa episode in the summer of 1954, although it

involved territory pertaining to a member of the NATO, as well as certain situations

developing in Egypt at approximately the same time, gave rise to many doubts as to

whether these questions could properly be discussed within NATO.

But, meanwhile, the USSR was in the process of developing its sphere of political

strategy, whatever differences of form or intensity it assumed, in Egypt, Syria, Yemen,

Kerala, Guatemala, and also in the attempts of seizing power from within in Ceylon,

Indonesia, British Guiana, etc.

At the same time equipment was delivered to India for the installation of a steel mill,

which was considered one of the first steps for conferring political substance to the

commercial relations of Russia abroad; there were also offers of technical assistance,

tempting financial loans, purchase of crops such as rice from Burma, cotton from Egypt,

the sale of which was difficult for certain countries, and so forth.

Russia also made approaches in Germany with the bait of alluring possibilities offered

by the Chinese market in process of industrialization.

2. Under these circumstances the common interest of the NATO members came to spread

steadily beyond the Treaty's limited sphere of application and economic elements came to

be integrated into political ones, thus creating critical situations of which the Middle

Eastern problem and the oil supplies for Europe afford a good example.

At the same time the necessity grew for steadily strengthening the economic potential

of the NATO members.

I shall not dwell on the great difficulties and the limitations of this closer collaboration;

Professor Gordon made the point clear in his paper and Ambassador Quaroni has shown

how conspicuous and frequent but justifiable have been, and may still be, the divergencies

between the allies' viewpoints. This recalls Hegel's saying that the "tragedy of life does

not consist in the contrast between just and unjust but between just and just."

3. On the other hand, now that the era of nations tends towards becoming that of

continents and maybe—let us hope in a co-operative sense—the era of races, history is

flowing towards political organizations wherein diplomacy must adopt methods which

political economy already judges valid.

At this important stage in history, the West needs at least an organized centre for

consultations and contacts. A mathematician would tell us that the bilateral meetings

required for fifteen Nations would amount to the figure of 105. One smiles at this figure

and it only helps to emphasize the importance of a group procedure to secure—as M.

Spaak puts it—if not a common group policy, in all cases at least a co-ordinated one.

It would be a mistake to create rigid rules which might prevent freedom and rapidity of

action in cases where this would not risk dangerous repercussions for other members. But

it is impossible to deny that many difficulties could have been avoided if the West had

discussed the general problem of relations with Egypt in good time, not to speak of the

withdrawal of financial aid for the Aswan Dam and the Anglo-French expedition to Suez.

4. The Western Community has made some successful

experiments which create interesting precedents. Among other things

I am thinking of trade with Russia and China, where, despite

differences of opinion, the West as a whole did achieve a common

course of action.

The system of infrastructure has shown a perfect integration of military aims and

progress in civil relations. May this programme be extended to other fields, for instance to

that of international roads?

I am also thinking of the common programmes for new and bigger

sources of atomic and conventional power in order to make the West less

dependent on specific areas of supply. NATO has also been studying,

perhaps not too profoundly, programmes of civil mobilization. The new

strategy certainly requires a fresh study which may bear on some

economic trends of its members.

In some instances, which should not however be generalized for fear of dangerous

repercussions, it might perhaps be wise to consider the purchase of certain crops from

countries which cannot dispose of them easily, in order to prevent problems of this nature

from having a political impact.

5. I am also contemplating, but it may be too ambitious, a joint discussion, even if on

general lines, of priorities in economic aid to foreign countries, in so far as they reflect

politically and strategically on problems pertaining to the specific competence of NATO.

The full weight of American financial power, together with the efforts which Canada and

some European countries may make in this field, does not suffice to meet the long list of

needs of the uncommitted nations.

I will not dwell here on the possible continuation of assistance within the group of

members of the Alliance, a problem which one should consider not in terms of grants but

of other forms of collaboration.

I belong to a country which stands in an intermediate position with highly

industrialized areas and others which are much less so. In Italy, one feels very strongly the

social and political importance, not to mention the economic one, of the national effort

which is being made to eliminate the difference.

6. As to the problem which presents such a particular interest for the NATO Alliance

and which we have discussed in previous meetings, i.e. the penetration of the civilization,

ethics, and ideals of the West among the uncommitted Nations; contrary to the mastery

with which business advertising is conducted and party propaganda campaigns launched,

Western Nations, as a whole, have failed in this art, however noble the pursuit.

In this field, moreover, it would be fundamental that the same language be spoken.

One should increasingly try to create in the leading class of the new countries, over and

above admiration for our technical standards, respect for and adhesion to our political and

moral standards.

In a particular branch of this field the United Nations have contemplated the creation of

centres for training elements capable of proceeding to underdeveloped countries to give

them the benefit of their own experience not only in the technical but also in the

administrative field—as for instance in the Civil Service. There was a negative reaction

on the part of some of these new countries who saw in this proposal an attempt to

intervene in matters of their own concern. The West should train for the above purpose

not their own citizens but nationals of the countries to be helped who will in their future

work be also inspired by what they have seen and learned by living in our environment.

7. My last words will concern a more spiritual subject which is also connected with our

problem. Without delving into the matter of religious conversion, but thinking in simpler

terms of the prestige of Christianity, which identifies itself with our Western civilization, I

must confess my feeling of discouragement on reading that the representatives of no less

than 170 different bodies: Lutheran, Anglican, Orthodox Christian, met at the last

gathering in New Haven, United States. I inferred from talks with acquaintances in Africa

and Asia, how damaging to our prestige are the divergencies between followers of the

same Christian faith and moral law; these differences are even more noxious when,

however rarely, they reach the point of petty rivalry.

I should not like to surprise anybody by adding that it would present an immense

advantage to stress what we have in common for instance in the anti-Communistic field

with the Islamic faith.

The document presents an essay on the Bilderberg Group, written by one of its founding members and permanent secretary Joseph Retinger in 1956.

The Bilderberg Group, Bilderberg conference, or Bilderberg Club is an "off the record" meeting of around 130 transatlantic political and military leaders, business and banking executives, royalty and other power elites. It has been meeting annually since 1954. Despite its influence on postwar history, which arguably eclipses that of the G8 conference, it does not not have a web site and nor does it publicly release records of its meetings.

This year's meeting is stated to be in Greece from 14 May 2009-16 May 2009.

For background on the group's activities, see this BBC radio 4 report and this Asia Times article.

The documents in this series were housed by Dynbase, a subscription only biographical, genealogical, and organizational database, which became defunct in 2006.

THE BILDERBERG GROUP

by

DR J. H. RETINGER

THE BILDERBERG GROUPbyDR J. H. RETINGER

A few years ago a large number of people began to feel anxious about a growing distrust of America

which was making itself manifest in Western Europe and which was paralleled by a similar distrust of

Western Europe in America. This feeling caused considerable apprehension on both sides of the Atlantic

and in 1952 I felt that it was of the first importance to try to remove this suspicion, distrust, and lack of

confidence which threatened to jeopardize the post-war work of the Western Allies.

I therefore approached H.R.H. Prince Bernhard, Dr Paul Rykens, and M. Paul van Zeeland with the

suggestion that we should organize some unofficial and private meetings to discuss the difficulties and

dangers which were causing us so much anxiety. To these meetings we would invite influential and

reliable people who carried the respect of those working in the field of national and international affairs

and whose personal contact with men at the summit of public activity could help to smooth over these

difficulties. Acting on the advice of my three friends, I approached about a dozen other people, viz.: Mr.

Hugh Gaitskell, Major-General Sir Colin Gubbins, Mr. Ole Bjorn Kraft, M. Guy Mollet, Dr Rudolf

Mueller,

M. Antoine Pinay, M. P. Pipinelis, M. Max Brauer, Marshal of the R.A.F. Lord Portal of

Hungerford, Ambassador Quaroni, and Signor de Gasperi. In our view the improvement of relations

between America and Europe ought not to be undertaken through any special publicity or propaganda,

since it was of far greater consequence to us to have mutual understanding and goodwill among men

occupying the highest positions in the life of each country than to try to influence the man in the street

directly. We had to consider how it would be possible to hold frank and full discussions on these

problems. In official international meetings, which are attended by representatives accompanied by a

retinue of experts and civil servants, there are few opportunities for discussion, for three reasons:

1 Through fear of indiscretion, representatives discuss only the problems, not their mutual

reactions or the reactions those problems would provoke among the Western countries.

1 They are swamped by details and practical considerations instead of being able to go to the core

of the subject under discussion.

3. If they are not able to reach agreement on a certain point they shelve it in order to

avoid giving the impression of disunity. Consequently, incidents occur which could have been foreseen

and which are almost unavoidable in such circumstances.

On the other hand, when international meetings take place between representatives of only a few

countries not all inter-related problems can be discussed, because there is no adequate representation to

emphasize the points of all individual countries.

Finally, the leaders of public life are not only politicians. Other big interests—religious, financial,

industrial, trade-unionist, intellectual—are also responsible for the relationship among countries. The

second point we had to consider consisted in ensuring that frank conversations could take place without

running the risk of being misinterpreted by the press and that there should be no interminable speeches

for the sake of publicity. It was clear, therefore, that such conversations had to be conducted privately,

unofficially, and confidentially, and for this reason we decided not to admit the press to our meetings,

restricting publicity in general to one or two very short communiques which do not go into any details,

nor mention any individual speakers, in order to ensure that neither the subject of our discussions nor the

names of the participants should be given any publicity. Experience has proved this course to be the right

one, since our debates take place in a spirit of complete frankness and discretion, and participants are

never afraid that anything they say will be used against them.

Everybody who attends our meetings does so in his private capacity even if he is the leader of a

government, a party, or an association, and thus he is not responsible to his supporters for anything he

may say.

In order not to be accused of starting an unofficial political "mafia", we decided from the outset not to

consider ourselves a policy-making body but to have as our principal aim the smoothing over of

difficulties and tendencies among countries and the finding of a common approach in the various

fields—political, cultural, economic, and social. Moreover, we do not contemplate taking any direct

action. We draw the attention of existing organizations to the points in question; what those organizations

do remains their own responsibility. For this side of our work, however, we have always had the tacit

approval of the Governments of the countries to which the participants belong.

We have tried to attract to our group, and our attempt has been successful, people of various tendencies,

although we have not considered it necessary to have a representative of every tendency of every national

group. We think there is no necessity for instance to have every Catholic country represented by a

Catholic and every Protestant country represented by a Protestant. We believe that we should invite to

our group a certain number of Catholics wherever they may come from, as long as they have full

authority within their sphere of influence, and of course this applies equally to Protestants. In the same

way with trade-unionists, it has not proved necessary to have a representative of trade-unionists from all

the Western European countries. For this reason also it has been our custom to invite representatives in

the proportion of one-third politicians and one-fifth business , men and trade-unionists, the remainder

being intellectuals, professional men, and other leaders of public opinion. The first essential is

undoubtedly to have me1n of absolute personal and political integrity; the second, to have men of real

international standing, or whose position in their own countries is such as to give them considerable

influence in at least an important section of the population, men who in their own field hold a position of

authority and enjoy the confidence of their fellow-men; the third, to have men with no obvious

nationalistic bias and who are broad-minded when it comes to other people's problems which may

conflict with their own; last, but not least, men who, in addition to the qualifications just mentioned, can

be considered as animated by the highest public spirit.

It was further decided that to ensure all these conditions no official organization or association would be

set up, and no party, tendency or interest asked to nominate their representatives. Instead, we would

choose the people to be invited to take part in our meetings, mostly guided by the nature of the subjects

to be discussed, and using great care to preserve a strict balance. This decision has proved a wise one.

We hold round-table conferences with people whom we believe represent the general opinion of the

leaders of their country. At our meetings, however, we draw conclusions, but there is no voting on

resolutions.

Our chairman is H.R.H. Prince Bernhard. At our first meeting, however, M. van Zeeland presided,

while at our first international gathering at Bilderberg the chairmanship was held in rotation, as follows:

Prince Bern-hard, a Belgian, an American. For various reasons it was later decided that it would be better

to have one chairman, and to the satisfaction and pleasure of all concerned H.R.H. Prince Bernhard

accepted this position. He is the convenor of our international meetings, over which he also presides. I

am myself responsible for all the spadework for the group as a whole, as well as for the members for

Western Europe, while Mr. Joseph E. Johnson undertakes similar work in the American group. Mr. Paul

Rykens is the superintendent of our treasury. A Steering Committee has now been set up which is

composed of the original members on the European side, except that the late Signor de Gasperi has been

replaced by Signor Amintore Fanfani. In addition, the following persons have become members: Sir

Terence Airey, Mr. Jens Christian Hauge, Mr. D. Healey, Mr. E. N. van Kleffens, Mr. Reginald

Maudling, Mr. Alfred Robens, Professor Carlo Schmid, and Mr. Otto Wolff von Amerongen. On the

American side there are five members in addition to Mr. Johnson, viz.: Mr. George Ball, Mr. John H.

Ferguson, Mr. H. J. Heinz, Mr. George Nebolsine, and Mr. Dean Rusk.*

So far as participants in the international conferences are concerned, the main core remains the same,

but since there are always different problems to be studied different people must be invited to each

conference.

It is our desire to keep this group as a loosely knit association with no rules of procedure except

those acquired by experience. For this reason, and because of the fact that there are no properly

established offices, the central office having been set up in my own flat, the running expenses are very

small. Moreover I myself as honorary secretary involve the group in no financial obligations; only my

immediate collaborators, consisting of not more than four people, receive any remuneration. Apart

from the cost of running the office, the expenses consist mainly in covering the cost of meetings of the

Steering Committee and of international conferences. It must be added, however, that the hospitality at

these conferences is always offered by the host country, while the cost of the work of the secretariat,

simultaneous interpretation, translation, printing, etc., is borne by the international secretariat. The total

expenditure therefore is small and has so far been covered completely by private subscriptions. Thus

the money received or spent has no strings, political or otherwise, attached to it. Most of the year 1952

was spent in private consultations between two or three people. A first meeting was held in Paris on 25

September 1952 and was attended by all the original members of the group: Prince Bernhard of the

Netherlands, Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, Sir Colin Gubbins, M. Guy Mollet, Dr

* How and when the non-European personalities, especially the American, joined our group will be explained later.

Rudolf Mueller, M. Antoine Pinay, M. P. Pipinelis, Dr J. H. Retinger, Mr. Paul Rykens, and M. Paul van

Zeeland. The only two who could not attend were Lord Portal and Signor de Gasperi. At this meeting we

discussed what could be done to improve American-European relations and on the initiative of M. van

Zeeland we decided to set up a corresponding group in the United States.

In November 1952 I went to the United States. Soon afterwards came H.R.H. Prince Bernhard and,

finally, M. van Zeeland. We approached certain members of the Democratic administration which was

still in office. Mr. Averell Harriman was especially interested in this work, but of course the new

administration had to be consulted and, on the advice of members of the Truman administration, we

approached Republican leaders. H.R.H. Prince Bernhard, M. van Zeeland and myself contacted a large

number of Americans of both parties and their reaction was always very good. Owing to the change of

administration and for other practical reasons, it took some time to form an American group. Finally,

however, through the good offices of Mr. C. D. Jackson and Mr. John Coleman, an American group was

constituted and it was decided to call a conference which actually took place in Bilderberg from 29 to 31

May 1954.

Later on Mr. Coleman was obliged, on account of illness, to retire from the chairmanship of the

American team and was succeeded by Mr. Dean Rusk. It was thought useful to appoint an American

honorary secretary, who was, and still is, Mr. Joseph E. Johnson. During the four years which followed,

other countries were invited to join in our work and participants from the following European countries

have been present at our meetings: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. From outside Europe, apart from Americans,

we have had at our conferences personalities from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan. So far

four plenary conferences have been held:

1 Bilderberg, Oosterbeek, Holland 29-31 May 1954

2 Barbizon, France 18-20 March 1955

3 Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany 23-25 September 1955

4 Fredensborg, Denmark 11-13 May 1956The themes discussed were: The attitude towards

Communism and the Soviet

Union. The attitude towards dependent areas and peoples overseas.

The attitude towards economic policies and problems. The attitude

towards European integration and the European Defence

Community. Communist infiltration in various Western countries.

The Uncommitted Peoples:

(b) economic aspects.Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The political and strategic aspects

of atomic energy. The reunification of Germany. European unity. The industrial aspects of atomic

energy. Economic problems:

(a) East-West trade.

(b) The political aspects of convertibility.

(c) Expansion of international trade. The causes of the growth of anti-Western blocs, in

particular in the United Nations. The role played by anti-colonialism in the relations between Asians and

Westerners. A common approach by the Western world towards China and the emergent nations of South

and

East Asia.

The Communist campaign for political subversion or control of the newly emancipated countries of

Asia.

How best the West can meet Asian requirements in the technical and economic fields.

A Steering Committee was formed from the original founders of the group, in which the Americans

mentioned above now participate. Subjects which do not need a long preparation as far as papers to be

presented are concerned, and for which an attendance of fifteen to twenty people seems sufficient, are

discussed from time to time in this smaller group.

Since the group is not a policy-making body, its principal object being to smooth over difficulties

between Western Europe and the United States with a view to improving their mutual relations, together

with difficulties among European countries or even certain extra-European countries, it would be

impossible to define what the group has achieved. We certainly provide a meeting-place for various

distinguished personalities having authority in their own particular fields of action. We have found that

an exchange of views is very helpful, and may sometimes produce new ideas, and that in a way the group

may be a factory of initiative. We decided, however, that none of the new ideas and initiatives would be

developed by the group, but that they should be passed on to some persons or organization who could

further develop them.

This document presents the meeting report for the Bilderberg meeting of 1980, that took place from April 18-20 at the Dorint Sofitel Quellenhof in Aachen, Germany.

The Bilderberg Group, Bilderberg conference, or Bilderberg Club is an "off the record" meeting of around 130 transatlantic political and military leaders, business and banking executives, royalty and other power elites. It has been meeting annually since 1954. Despite its influence on postwar history, which arguably eclipses that of the G8 conference, it does not not have a web site and nor does it publicly release records of its meetings.

This year's meeting is stated to be in Greece from 14 May 2009-16 May 2009.

For background on the group's activities, see this BBC radio 4 report and this Asia Times article.

The documents in this series were housed by Dynbase, a subscription only biographical, genealogical, and organizational database, which became defunct in 2006.

This document presents the meeting report for the Bilderberg meeting of 1963, that took place from May 29-31 in Cannes, France.

The Bilderberg Group, Bilderberg conference, or Bilderberg Club is an "off the record" meeting of around 130 transatlantic political and military leaders, business and banking executives, royalty and other power elites. It has been meeting annually since 1954. Despite its influence on postwar history, which arguably eclipses that of the G8 conference, it does not not have a web site and nor does it publicly release records of its meetings.

This year's meeting is stated to be in Greece from 14 May 2009-16 May 2009.

For background on the group's activities, see this BBC radio 4 report and this Asia Times article.

The documents in this series were housed by Dynbase, a subscription only biographical, genealogical, and organizational database, which became defunct in 2006.